Integrating post-quantum cryptography into real-world protocols

Douglas Stebila



https://www.douglas.stebila.ca/research/presentations/

SAC Summer School • 2022-08-22

Outline

Part 1: Existing protocol designs

- Classical + PQ key exchange
- Classical + PQ signatures
- Performance

Part 2: Alternative protocol designs• KEMTLS

KEMTLS

Reimagining of TLS 1.3 handshake to use key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) for implicit authentication, rather than digital signatures for explicit authentication

- Reduce communication sizes in PQ setting since PQ KEMs are in general smaller than PQ signatures
- Can reduce computation costs in some configurations

Outline

1. KEMTLS design and performance 2. Pre-distributed public keys for faster client authentication 3. Proving KEMTLS manually and with Tamarin 4. Certificate lifecycle for **KEM** public keys

1. KEMTLS design and performance

Peter Schwabe, <u>Douglas Stebila</u>, Thom Wiggers ACM CCS 2020. <u>https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/534</u>

Sofía Celi, Peter Schwabe, <u>Douglas Stebila</u>, Nick Sullivan, Thom Wiggers. <u>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-celi-wiggers-tls-authkem-00</u>

Authenticated key exchange

Two parties establish a shared secret over a public communication channel

Vast literature on AKE protocols

- Many security definitions capturing various adversarial powers: BR, CK, eCK, ...
- Different types of authentication credentials: public key, shared secret key, password, identity-based, ...
- Additional security goals: weak/strong forward secrecy, key compromise impersonation resistance, post-compromise security, ...
- Additional protocol functionality: multi-stage, ratcheting, ...
- Group key exchange
- Real-world protocols: TLS, SSH, Signal, IKE, ISO, EMV, ...


Explicit authentication

Alice receives assurance that she really is talking to Bob


Implicit authentication

Alice is assured that only Bob would be able to compute the shared secret

Explicitly authenticated key exchange: Signed Diffie–Hellman



Implicitly authenticated key exchange: Double-DH



Problem

post-quantum signatures are big

Signature scheme		Public key (bytes)	Signature (bytes)
RSA-2048	Factoring	272	256
Elliptic curves	Elliptic curve discrete logarithm	32	32
Dilithium	Lattice-based (MLWE/MSIS)	1,184	2,044
Falcon	Lattice-based (NTRU)	897	690
XMSS	Hash-based	32	979
Rainbow	Multi-variate	60,192	66

Solution

use post-quantum KEMs for authentication

Key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs)

An abstraction of Diffie–Hellman key exchange

 $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathsf{KEM}.\mathsf{KeyGen}() \xrightarrow{pk} (ct, k) \leftarrow \mathsf{KEM}.\mathsf{Encaps}(pk) \xrightarrow{ct} k \leftarrow \mathsf{KEM}.\mathsf{Decaps}(sk, ct)$

Signature scheme		Public key (bytes)	Signature (bytes)
RSA-2048	Factoring	272	256
Elliptic curves	Elliptic curve discrete logarithm	32	32
Dilithium	Lattice-based (MLWE/MSIS)	1,184	2,044
Falcon	Lattice-based (NTRU)	897	690
XMSS	Hash-based	32	979
Rainbow	Multi-variate	60,192	66
KEM		Public key (bytes)	Ciphertext (bytes)
RSA-2048	Factoring	272	256
Elliptic curves	Elliptic curve discrete logarithm	32	32
Kyber	Lattice-based (MLWE)	800	768
NTRU	Lattice-based (NTRU)	699	699
Saber	Lattice-based (MLWR)	672	736
SIKE	Isogeny-based	330	330
SIKE compressed	Isogeny-based	197	197
Classic McEliece	Code-based	261,120	128

Implicitly authenticated KEX is not new

In theory

- DH-based: SKEME, MQV, HMQV, ...
- •KEM-based: BCGP09, FSXY12, ...

<u>In practice</u>


- RSA key transport in TLS ≤ 1.2
 - Lacks forward secrecy
- Signal, Noise, Wireguard
 - DH-based
 - Different protocol flows
- OPTLS
 - DH-based
 - Requires a non-interactive key exchange (NIKE)

KEMTLS handshake

KEM for ephemeral key exchange

KEM for server-to-client authenticated key exchange

Combine shared secrets



AEAD_{K_2} (key confirmation), AEAD_{K'_2} (application data)

 $AEAD_{K_{2}^{\prime\prime}}$ (key confirmation)

 $AEAD_{K_2'''}$ (application data)

Algorithm choices

KEM for ephemeral key exchange

KEM for authenticated key exchange

Signature scheme for intermediate CA

Signature scheme for root CA

Algorithm choices

KEM for ephemeral

key exchange

- IND-CCA (or IND-1CCA)
- Want small public key + small ciphertext

Signature scheme for intermediate CA

Want small public key
 + small signature

KEM for authenticated key exchange

- IND-CCA
- Want small public key
 + small ciphertext

Signature scheme for root CA

• Want small signature

4 scenarios

- 1. Minimize size when intermediate certificate transmitted
- 2. Minimize size when intermediate certificate not transmitted (cached)
- 3. Use solely NTRU assumptions
- 4. Use solely module LWE/SIS assumptions

Signed KEX versus **KEMTLS**

Labels ABCD:

D = root CA

eCDH X25519,

Dilithium,

Falcon,

Rainbow.

rSA-2048,

Kyber, NTRU


SIKE,

XMSS'

A = ephemeral KEM

Algorithms: (all level 1)

B = leaf certificateC = intermediate CA



3

RTT

2

RTT

Signed KEX versus KEMTLS

Labels ABCD: A = ephemeral KEM B = leaf certificate C = intermediate CA D = root CA Algorithms: (all level 1) Dilithium,

eCDH X25519,

Falcon.


Rainbow.

rSA-2048,

Kyber, NTRU

SIKE,

XMSS



KEMTLS benefits

- Size-optimized KEMTLS requires < ½ communication of sizeoptimized PQ signed-KEM
- Speed-optimized KEMTLS uses 90% fewer server CPU cycles and still reduces communication
 - NTRU KEX (27 μ s) 10x faster than Falcon signing (254 μ s)
- No extra round trips required until client starts sending application data in server-only auth mode
- Smaller trusted code base (no signature generation on client/server)

Variant: KEMTLS with client authentication

- 1. Client has a long-term KEM public key
- 2. Client transmits it encrypted under key derived from
 - a) server long-term KEM key exchange
 - b) ephemeral KEM key exchange
- Preserves client confidentiality
- •Adds extra round trip

2. Pre-distributed public keys for faster client authentication

Peter Schwabe, <u>Douglas Stebila</u>, Thom Wiggers ESORICS 2021. <u>https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/779</u>

Sofía Celi, Peter Schwabe, <u>Douglas Stebila</u>, Nick Sullivan, Thom Wiggers. <u>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-celi-wiggers-tls-authkem-00</u>

Variant: Pre-distributed public keys

- What if server public keys are predistributed?
 - Cached in a browser
 - Pinned in mobile apps
 - Embedded in IoT devices
 - Out-of-band (e.g., DNS)
 - TLS 1.3: RFC 7924

Different from TLS 1.3 pre-shared symmetric key mode


- PSK is a harder(?) key management problem
- Different compromise model

Variant: Pre-distributed public keys

- Alternate KEMTLS protocol flow when server certificates are known in advance
- Resumption-style mechanism that avoids the downsides of symmetric-key TLS PSK
- Given server's long-term key, client can send ciphertext in ClientHello
- Also allow to send client certificate in ClientHello

Get a **1-RTT**, TLS 1.3-shape handshake with implicit authentication

KEMTLS-PDK handshake server-only auth.



KEM for ephemeral key exchange

KEM for server-to-client authenticated key exchange

Combine shared secrets

 $K, K', K'', K''' \leftarrow \frac{\mathsf{KDF}(\mathsf{ss}_S || \mathsf{ss}_e)}{\mathsf{AEAD}_K(\text{key confirmation})}$

 $\mathsf{AEAD}_{K'}(application data)$

 $\mathsf{AEAD}_{K''}$ (key confirmation)

 $\mathsf{AEAD}_{K'''}$ (application data)


KEMTLS-PDK handshake mutual auth

KEM for ephemeral key exchange

KEM for server-to-client authenticated key exchange

KEM for client-to-server authenticated key exchange

Combine shared secrets



Benefits from pre-distributed key variant

- Additional bandwidth savings
- •Makes some PQ algorithms viable
 - Large public keys, small ciphertexts/signatures: Classic McEliece and Rainbow
- Client authentication 1 round-trip earlier if proactive
- Explicit server authentication 1 round-trip earlier
 - => better downgrade resilience

KEMTLS variants

Traditional communication flow:

- 1. KEMTLS server-only authentication
- 2. KEMTLS mutual authentication

Pre-distributed server public keys:

- 3. KEMTLS-PDK server-only authentication
- 4. KEMTLS-PDK mutual authentication

3. Proving KEMTLS manually and with Tamarin

Peter Schwabe, <u>Douglas Stebila</u>, Thom Wiggers ACM CCS 2020. <u>https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/534</u>

Peter Schwabe, <u>Douglas Stebila</u>, Thom Wiggers ESORICS 2021. <u>https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/779</u>

Sofía Celi, Jonathan Hoyland, <u>Douglas Stebila</u>, Thom Wiggers Coming soon to an eprint server near you! <u>https://github.com/thomwiggers/TLS13Tamarin</u> <u>https://github.com/dstebila/KEMTLS-Tamarin/</u>

Key indistinguishability

Security properties

Forward secrecy


Implicit and explicit authentication

Deniability

Multi-stage authenticated key exchange model for KEMTLS

- \rightarrow Bellare–Rogaway AKE model
- → Multi-stage AKE model [FG14]
- → Multi-stage AKE model for TLS 1.3 [DFG<u>S</u>15]

[BR93] Bellare, Rogaway, Crypto'93. [FG14] Fischlin, Günther, ACM CCS 2014. [DFGS15] Dowling, Fischlin, Günther, Stebila, ACM CCS 2015.



Security subtleties: authentication

Implicit authentication

 Client's first application flow can't be read by anyone other than intended server, but client doesn't know server is live at the time of sending

Explicit authentication

- Explicit authentication once key confirmation message transmitted
- Retroactive explicit authentication of earlier keys

Security subtleties: downgrade resilience

- Choice of cryptographic algorithms not authenticated at the time the client sends its first application flow
 - MITM can't trick client into using undesirable algorithm
 - But MITM *can* trick them into *temporarily* using suboptimal algorithm

- Formally model 3 levels of downgrade-resilience:
 - 1. Full downgrade resilience
 - 2. No downgrade resilience to unsupported algorithms
 - 3. No downgrade resilience

Security subtleties: forward secrecy

Does compromise of a party's long-term key allow decryption of past sessions?

- Weak forward secrecy 1: adversary passive in the test stage
- Weak forward secrecy 2: adversary passive in the test stage or never corrupted peer's long-term key
- Forward secrecy: adversary passive in the test stage or didn't corrupt peer's long-term key before acceptance

Security subtleties: deniability

- •KEMTLS and KEMTLS-PDK don't use signatures for authentication
- Yields offline deniability
 - Judge cannot distinguish honest transcript from forgery
- Does not yield online deniability
 - When one party doesn't follow protocol or colludes with judge

Security analyses of KEMTLS & KEMTLS-PDK

Pen-and-paper

- Proves session key security and authentication in the multistage key exchange model
- Using provable security paradigm

Formal verification

Using Tamarin prover (a symbolic model checker):

- Adaptation of full-scale TLS


 1.3 Tamarin model of
 [CHHSV] to capture KEMTLS
 & KEMTLS-PDK
- 2. Tamarin analog of pen-andpaper multi-stage key exchange model

Tamarin prover: https://tamarin-prover.github.io/ [CHHSV] Cremers, Horvat, Hoyland, Scott, van der Merwe. ACM CCS 2017.

39


Provable security approach to analyzing key exchange protocols

1. describe abstract protocol




Provable security approach to analyzing key exchange protocols

1. describe abstract protocol 2. define security




Provable security approach to analyzing key exchange protocols




(extending [Bellare-Rogaway93])







[FG14], [Dow+15], [Dow+16], [FG17], [Gün18], [Dow+21]




[FG14], [Dow+15], [Dow+16], [FG17], [Gün18], [Dow+21]




[FG14], [Dow+15], [Dow+16], [FG17], [Gün18], [Dow+21]




[FG14], [Dow+15], [Dow+16], [FG17], [Gün18], [Dow+21]



[FG14], [Dow+15], [Dow+16], [FG17], [Gün18], [Dow+21]



[FG14], [Dow+15], [Dow+16], [FG17], [Gün18], [Dow+21]



[FG14], [Dow+15], [Dow+16], [FG17], [Gün18], [Dow+21]

Pen and paper proof in the multi-stage model

Session key indistinguishability

- For every stage key
- With 1 of 3 levels of forward secrecy varying by stage
- Retroactive upgrade
- Adversary powers:
 - Network control
 - Corrupt long-term keys
 - Reveal session keys

Authentication ("malicious acceptance")

- Expectations varying by stage
- Retroactive upgrade
- Includes replayability (non-uniqueness) for some PDK stages

Cryptographic assumptions

- IND-CCA for long-term KEM
- IND-1CCA for ephemeral KEM
- Collision-resistant hash function
- Dual-PRF security of HKDF
- EUF-CMA of HMAC

[BR93] Bellare, Rogaway, Crypto'93. [FG14] Fischlin, Günther, ACM CCS 2014. [DFGS15] Dowling, Fischlin, Günther, Stebila, ACM CCS 2015.

Limitations of pen-and-paper proofs

- Fully written out for session-key indistinguishability for KEMTLS and KEMTLS-PDK serveronly auth variants
 - But only as reliable as the authors and the readers are

- Proof sketches for session-key indistinguishability of remaining variants
- Hand-waving argument for offline deniability

Formal verification using Tamarin

- Tamarin prover is a model checker for security protocols in the symbolic model
- Protocol and adversary powers are specified as a set of state machine transitions ("multiset rewriting rules")
- Security property is specified as a predicate over actions recorded during state machine transitions
- Tamarin prover explores (infinite) state space of all possible executions to find an execution trace that violates the security property or verifies that none exists (or fails to terminate)

Formal verification using Tamarin

- Tamarin successfully used on many academic and real-world cryptographic protocols
- Especially effective on key exchange protocols
 - Note Tamarin models key exchange security based on *learning* session key, not *indistinguishability*

- Tamarin model of TLS 1.3 drafts [CHSV,CHHSV] found several flaws
 - Especially in interactions between different protocols modes
 - e.g. in TLS 1.3 pre-shared key resumption
 - Expensive: months of personeffort, 1 week of computation time, 100 GB RAM

[CHSV] Cremers, Horvat, Scott, van der Merwe, IEEE S&P 2016. [CHHSV] Cremers, Horvat, Hoyland, Scott, van der Merwe, ACM CCS 2017.

Modelling KEMTLS using TamarinApproach 1Approach 2

https://github.com/thomwiggers/TLS13Tamarin

- Adapt [CHHSV] full-scale Tamarin model of TLS 1.3 to KEMTLS
- High resolution protocol specification: captures TLS message format, internal KDF structure, ...
- Lower resolution security properties
- Required more human effort to get proofs running automatically

https://github.com/dstebila/KEMTLS-Tamarin

- Encode pen-and-paper multistage AKE definitions in Tamarin
- Lower resolution protocol specification: "core cryptographic" of KEMTLS
 - E.g. No TLS message structure
- Higher resolution security properties
- Simpler to specify and automatically proves

Feature	In model of	
	Approach 1	Approach 2
Protocol modelling		
Encrypted handshake messages	✓	×
HKDF and HMAC decomposed into hash calls	\checkmark	×
Key exch. and auth. KEMs are the same algorithm	\checkmark	×
TLS message structure	\checkmark	×
Security properties		
Adversary can reveal long-term keys	✓	✓
Adversary can reveal ephemeral keys	\checkmark	×
Adversary can reveal intermediate session keys	×	1
Secrecy of handshake and application traffic keys	\checkmark	1
Forward secrecy	\checkmark	1
Multiple flavours of forward secrecy	×	1
Explicit authentication	\checkmark	1
Deniability	×	✓

Lessons learned from formal verification

- Higher assurance in protocol design
- Captures potential interactions between all 4 protocol variants
- Exhibits difficulty trade-off in formal verification: granularity of protocol specification

versus granularity of security properties

- Formal verification identified bugs in previous work:
 - Approach 1 identified minor bugs in original TLS 1.3 Tamarin model of [CHHSV]
 - Approach 2 identified minor bugs in security properties stated in original KEMTLS and KEMTLS-PDK papers
 - E.g. Wrong retroactive authentication stages or incorrect forward secrecy levels for some stages

4. Certificate lifecycle for KEM public keys

Tim Güneysu, Philip Hodges, Georg Land, Mike Ounsworth, <u>Douglas Stebila</u>, Greg Zaverucha Coming soon to an eprint server near you!

TLS ecosystem is complex – lots to consider!

- Datagram TLS
- Use of TLS handshake in other protocols
 - e.g. QUIC
- Application-specific behaviour
 - e.g. HTTP3 SETTINGS frame not server authenticated
- PKI involving KEM public keys
- Long tail of implementations

Certificate lifecycle



Certificate requests in the X.509 PKI

How does requester prove possession of corresponding secret keys?


- 1. Interactive challenge-response protocol [RFC 4210 Sect. 5.2.8.3]
- 2. Send certificate back encrypted under subject public key [RFC 4210 Sect. 5.2.8.2]
 - Weird confidentiality requirement on certificate.
 - Maybe broken by Certificate Transparency or other logging mechanisms?
- 3. Non-interactive certificate signing requests [RFC 2986]
 - CSRs okay for signature schemes, but not for public key encryption or key encapsulation mechanisms

Goal: Design non-interactive proof of possession for lattice-based KEM public keys

(so that we can have the same certificate lifecycle for KEM certificates to enable KEMTLS)

lattice-based = FrodoKEM (plain LWE), Kyber (module LWE)

Possible approaches for non-interactive proof of possession for (lattice-based) KEM public keys



Our approach

Proof of possession via *verifiable generation*

Generate the key and a proof at the same time

FrodoKEM key generation

- 1. Generate $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$ from a seed
- 2. Sample $\mathbf{S} \leftarrow \chi^{n \times \overline{n}}$
- 3. Sample $\mathbf{E} \leftarrow \chi^{n \times \overline{n}}$
- 4. Compute $\mathbf{B} \leftarrow \mathbf{s} \mathbf{AS} + \mathbf{E}$
- 5. Public key: $(seed_A, B)$
- 6. Secret key: \mathbf{S}

$$\frac{\text{Frodo-640}}{q = 2^{15}}$$
$$n = 640, \overline{n} = 8$$
$$\chi \in [-12, \dots, 12]$$

Verifiable generation for FrodoKEM

- 1. Generate and commit to many allegedly small values for S and E
- 2. Reveal some of them to prove they're small
- 3. Use the rest for the actual key generation

This doesn't prove that all the unrevealed values are small, only most of them with high probability

How do we prove we actually used them in the rest of the key generation?

- MPC-in-the-head à la Picnic
- Fiat–Shamir to get a signature scheme

5-round interactive protocol for verifiable generation

- Prover: Generate sufficiently many small values.
 Generate an additive secret sharing among N parties.
 Commit to the shares.
 Send commitments.
- 2. Verifier: Pick some fraction of the bundles to audit.
- Prover: Open commitments for challenged bundles. Use unaudited bundles to

construct secret key (S, E) and public key B=AS+E. Commit to shares of B. Send commitments and public

key (A, B).

- 4. Verifier: Select N-1 parties to audit.
- 5. Prover: Reveal state of N-1 parties.
- 6. Verifier: Check state of revealed parties.

Making it non-interactive

- Interactive protocol has soundness ¹/_N, which isn't cryptographically small.
- Repeat τ times to get soundness $1/N^{\tau}$.
- (Use the same bundles from step 1 in all repetitions.)
- Apply the Fiat–Shamir transform to make it noninteractive:
 - Generate challenges in step 2 and 4 by hashing all previous commitments with a random oracle.

Lots of nice optimizations

- Linear operations involving secrets are basically free in MPC-in-the-head, so multiplying public A by secret A doesn't add communication / increase size of proof
- Can generate lots of values from seeds and use seed trees to reduce size of proof
- Fast hashing using vectorized instructions

Defining security for proof of possession

Unforgeability:

 Hard to construct a valid proof of possession for an honest public key without the corresponding secret key

Zero knowledge:

• The proofs of possession leak no information about the secret key.

- Need to ensure the proof of possession composes nicely with the intended usage of the key
 - Zero knowledge shows the proof doesn't undermine the scheme
 - Need to extend unforgeability:
 - Use an "auxiliary secret key usage algorithm" in unforgeability experiment
 - Introduce a notion of KEM simulatability which FO-based KEMs have


Uniqueness of small FrodoKEM solutions

Recall high-level idea:


- 1. Generate and commit to many allegedly small values for S and E
- 2. Reveal some of them to prove they're small

This doesn't prove that all the unrevealed values are small, only most of them with high probability

- We prove a lemma upperbounding the probability that a second FrodoKEM solution exists with mostly small solutions
- Choose number of bundles to audit to ensure no other mostly small secret key exists
- So proving possession of a mostly small solution implies proving possession of the true secret key
- Similar result for Kyber



(b) FrodoKEM-640



Summary of verifiable generation

Verifiable generation with MPC-in-the-head yields reasonable proof sizes and runtimes for both FrodoKEM and Kyber at all security levels

- Smallest sizes can be competitive with direct lattice-based ZK constructions without needing to embed in a larger LWE instance with different parameters
- Order of magnitude smaller than previous MPC-in-thehead approaches

Integrating post-quantum cryptography into real-world protocols, part 2

Douglas Stebila

WATERLOO

KEMTLS

Implicitly authenticated TLS without handshake signatures using KEMs

- Saves bytes on the wire, server cycles
- Variants for client authentication and pre-distributed public keys

1. KEMTLS design and performance

- 2. Pre-distributed public keys for faster client authentication
- 3. Proving KEMTLS manually and with Tamarin
 - Two Tamarin models with different levels of granularity
- 4. Certificate lifecycle for KEM public keys
 - Proof of possession via verifiable generation using MPC-in-thehead

<u>https://www.douglas.stebila.ca/research</u> <u>https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/534</u> • <u>https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/779</u> <u>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-celi-wiggers-tls-authkem-00</u> <u>https://github.com/thomwiggers/TLS13Tamarin</u> • <u>https://github.com/dstebila/KEMTLS-Tamarin/</u>

Appendix

KEMTLS

exchange

Phase 1: ephemeral key

Server

TCP SYN TCP SYN-ACK

 $(pk_e, sk_e) \leftarrow KEM_e.Keygen()$ ClientHello: pk_e , $r_c \leftarrow s \{0, 1\}^{256}$, supported algs.

> ES←HKDF.Extract(0,0) dES←HKDF.Expand(ES, "derived", Ø)

> > $(ss_e, ct_e) \leftarrow KEM_e.Encapsulate(pk_e)$ ServerHello: $ct_e, r_s \leftarrow s \{0, 1\}^{256}$, selected algs.

 $ss_e \leftarrow KEM_e.Decapsulate(ct_e, sk_e)$

HS←HKDF.Extract(dES, ss_e) accept CHTS←HKDF.Expand(HS, "c hs traffic", CH..SH) accept SHTS←HKDF.Expand(HS, "s hs traffic", CH..SH) stage 2

 $dHS \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(HS, "derived", \emptyset)$

{EncryptedExtensions}_{stage2} {ServerCertificate}_{stage2}: cert[pk_S], int. CA cert.

 $(ss_S, ct_S) \leftarrow KEM_s.Encapsulate(pk_S)$ {ClientKemCiphertext}_{stage1}: ct_S

 $ss_S \leftarrow KEM_s$.Decapsulate(ct_S, sk_S)

 $AHS \leftarrow HKDF.Extract(dHS, ss_S)$

 accept CAHTS←HKDF.Expand(AHS, "c ahs traffic", CH..CKC)
 stage 3

 accept SAHTS←HKDF.Expand(AHS, "s ahs traffic", CH..CKC)
 stage 4

dAHS←HKDF.Expand(AHS, "derived", Ø)

MS←HKDF.Extract(dAHS,0) fk_c←HKDF.Expand(MS,"c finished",0) fk_s←HKDF.Expand(MS,"s finished",0)

{ClientFinished}_{stage3}: CF \leftarrow HMAC(fk_c, CH..CKC)

abort if CF \neq HMAC(fk_c, CH..CKC)

accept CATS←HKDF.Expand(MS,"c ap traffic",CH..CF) stage 5

record layer, AEAD-encrypted with key derived from CATS

{ServerFinished}_{stage4}: SF \leftarrow HMAC(fk_s, CH..CF)

abort if SF \neq HMAC(fk_s, CH..CF)

accept SATS←HKDF.Expand(MS, "s ap traffic", CH..SF)

record layer, AEAD-encrypted with key derived from SATS

Phase 3: Confirmation / explicit authentication

Phase 2: Implicitly authenticated key exchange

KEMTLS with client authentication

TCP SYN TCP SYN-ACK $(pk_e, sk_e) \leftarrow KEM_e.Keygen()$ ClientHello: pk_e , $r_c \leftarrow s \{0, 1\}^{256}$, supported algs. $ES \leftarrow HKDF.Extract(0, 0)$ $dES \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(ES, "derived", \emptyset)$ $(ss_e, ct_e) \leftarrow KEM_e$.Encapsulate(pk_e) ServerHello: $ct_e, r_s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}$, selected algs. $ss_e \leftarrow KEM_e$. Decapsulate(ct_e, sk_e) $HS \leftarrow HKDF.Extract(dES, ss_e)$ accept CHTS←HKDF.Expand(HS, "c hs traffic", CH..SH) stage $accept SHTS \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(HS, "s hs traffic", CH..SH)$ stage 2 $dHS \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(HS, "derived", \emptyset)$ {EncryptedExtensions}_{stage2} {ServerCertificate}_{stage2}: cert[pk_S], int. CA cert. {CertificateRequest}_{stage} cha $(ss_S, ct_S) \leftarrow KEM_s.Encapsulate(pk_S)$ {ClientKemCiphertext}_{stage1}: ct_S $ss_S \leftarrow KEM_s$. Decapsulate(ct_S, sk_S) $AHS \leftarrow HKDF.Extract(dHS, ss_S)$ accept CAHTS←HKDF.Expand(AHS, "c ahs traffic", CH..CKC) accept SAHTS←HKDF.Expand(AHS, "s ahs traffic", CH..CKC) Implicitly dAHS←HKDF.Expand(AHS, "derived", Ø) {ClientCertificate}_{stage3}: cert[pk_C], int. CA cert. ŝ $(ss_C, ct_C) \leftarrow KEM_c.Encapsulate(pk_C)$ Pha {ServerKemCiphertext}_{stage4}: ct_C $ss_C \leftarrow KEM_c.Decapsulate(ct_C, sk_C)$ $MS \leftarrow HKDF.Extract(dAHS, ss_C)$ $fk_c \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(MS, "c finished", \emptyset)$ ntication $fk_s \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(MS, "s finished", \emptyset)$ {ClientFinished}_{stage_3}: CF \leftarrow HMAC(fk_c, CH..SKC) **abort** if $CF \neq HMAC(fk_c, CH..SKC)$ plicit accept CATS←HKDF.Expand(MS, "c ap traffic", CH..CF) record layer, AEAD-encrypted with key derived from CATS {ServerFinished}_{stage4}: SF \leftarrow HMAC(fk_s, CH..CF) ÷ **abort** if SF \neq HMAC(fk_s, CH..CF) accept SATS←HKDF.Expand(MS, "s ap traffic", CH..SF) stage 6 Pha record layer, AEAD-encrypted with key derived from SATS

Server

Client

TLS 1.3 and KEMTLS size of public key objects

		Abbrv.	KEX (pk+ct)	Excluding HS auth (ct/sig)	; intermediate Leaf crt. subject (pk)	CA certificate Leaf crt. (signature)	Sum excl. int. CA cert.	Including i Int. CA crt. subject (pk)	ntermediate C Int. CA crt. (signature)	A certificate Sum incl. int. CA crt.	Root CA (pk)	Sum TCP pay- loads of TLS HS (incl. int. CA crt.)
	TLS 1.3	errr	ECDH (X25519) 64	RSA-2048 256	RSA-2048 272	RSA-2048 256	848	RSA-2048	RSA-2048 256	1376	RSA-2048 272	2829
I KEX)	Min. incl. int. CA cert.	SFXR	SIKE 433	Falcon 690	Falcon 897	XMSS ^{MT} 979	2999	XMSS ^{MT} 32	Rainbow 66	3097	Rainbow 161600	5378
(Signed KEX	Min. excl. int. CA cert.	SFRR	SIKE 433	Falcon 690	Falcon 897	Rainbow 66	2086	Rainbow 60192	Rainbow 66	62344	Rainbow 60192	64693
TLS 1.3	Assumption: MLWE+MSIS	KDDD	Kyber 1568	Dilithium 2420	Dilithium 1312	Dilithium 2420	7720	Dilithium 1312	Dilithium 2420	11452	Dilithium 1312	12639
	Assumption: NTRU	NFFF	NTRU 1398	Falcon 690	Falcon 897	Falcon 690	3675	Falcon 897	Falcon 690	5262	Falcon 897	6524
	Min. incl. int. CA cert.	SSXR	SIKE 433	SIKE 236	SIKE 197	XMSS ^{MT} 979	1845	XMSS ^{MT} 32	Rainbow 66	1943	Rainbow 60192	4252
VTLS	Min. excl. int. CA cert.	SSRR	SIKE 433	SIKE 236	SIKE 197	Rainbow 66	932	Rainbow 60192	Rainbow 66	61190	Rainbow 60192	63568
KEMTL	Assumption: MLWE+MSIS	KKDD	Kyber 1568	Kyber 768	Kyber 800	Dilithium 2420	5556	Dilithium 1312	Dilithium 2420	9288	Dilithium 1312	10471
	Assumption: NTRU	NNFF	NTRU 1398	NTRU 699	NTRU 699	Falcon 690	3486	Falcon 897	Falcon 690	5073	Falcon 897	6359

TLS 1.3 and KEMTLS crypto & handshake time

		Computation time for asymmetric crypt Excl. int. CA cert. Incl. int. CA cert				Handshake time (31.1 ms latency, 1000 Mbps bandwidth) Excl. int. CA cert. Incl. int. CA cert.				Handshake time (195.6 ms latency, 10 Mbps bandwidth) Excl. int. CA cert. Incl. int. CA cert.							
		Client	Server	Client	Server	Client sent req.	Client recv. resp.	Server HS done	Client sent req.	Client recv. resp.	Server HS done	Client sent req.	Client recv. resp.	Server HS done	Client sent req.	Client recv. resp.	Server HS done
TLS 1.3	errr	0.134	0.629	0.150	0.629	66.4	97.7	35.5	66.5	97.7	35.5	397.3	593.4	201.4	398.3	594.5	202.4
	SFXR	11.860	4.410	12.051	4.410	80.1	111.3	49.2	80.4	111.5	49.4	417.5	615.0	218.9	417.4	614.9	219.1
	SFRR	6.061	4.410	6.251	4.410	65.5	96.7	34.5	131.4	162.6	100.4	398.3	594.6	201.8	1846.8	2244.5	1578.7
	KDDD	0.059	0.072	0.081	0.072	63.8	95.1	32.9	64.1	95.4	33.2	405.1	602.3	208.3	410.3	609.8	212.8
	NFFF	0.138	0.241	0.180	0.241	64.8	96.0	33.8	65.1	96.4	34.2	397.8	593.9	201.2	399.8	596.0	203.2
KEMTLS	SSXR	15.998	7.173	16.188	7.173	84.5	124.6	62.5	84.3	124.4	62.3	417.5	625.8	232.5	417.6	625.8	232.4
	SSRR	10.198	7.173	10.388	7.173	75.5	116.3	54.2	140.3	182.3	120.1	408.5	616.5	223.5	1684.2	2091.6	1280.4
	KKDD	0.048	0.017	0.070	0.017	63.3	94.8	32.6	63.7	95.2	32.9	397.3	594.4	201.6	434.7	638.0	235.4
	NNFF	0.107	0.021	0.149	0.021	63.4	95.0	32.7	63.7	95.3	33.0	395.9	593.0	200.1	397.6	594.7	201.9

Label syntax: ABCD: A = ephemeral key exchange, B = leaf certificate, C = intermediate CA certificate, D = root certificate.

 $Label values: \underline{D}ilithium, \underline{e}CDH X25519, \underline{F}alcon, \underline{K}yber, \underline{N}TRU, \underline{R}ainbow, \underline{r}SA-2048, \underline{S}IKE, \underline{X}MSS_{s}^{MT}; all level-1 schemes.$

KEMTLS-PDK overview

Knows pk_S static (KEM_s): pk_S , sk_S	$ \begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$
$\begin{array}{l} (pk_e,sk_e) \leftarrow KEM_e.Keygen() \\ (ss_S,ct_S) \leftarrow KEM_e.Encapsulate(pk_S) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{l} \text{Knows } pk_S \\ (pk_e,sk_e) \leftarrow KEM_{e}.Keygen() \\ (ss_S,ct_S) \leftarrow KEM_{e}.Encapsulate(pk_S) \end{array}$
	$K_S \leftarrow KDF(ss_S)$
pk_e, ct_S	$pk_e, ct_S, AEAD_{K_S} \left(cert\left[pk_C\right]\right)$
$ss_S \leftarrow KEM_s.Decapsulate(ct_S,sk_S)$	$ss_S \leftarrow KEM_s.Decapsulate(ct_S,sk_S)$
$(ss_e, ct_e) \leftarrow KEM_{e}.Encapsulate(pk_e)$	$(ss_e, ct_e) \leftarrow KEM_e.Encapsulate(pk_e)$
	$(ss_C, ct_C) \leftarrow KEM_{c}.Encapsulate(pk_C)$
ct_e	ct_e
$ss_e \leftarrow KEM_{e}.Decapsulate(ct_e,sk_e)$	$ss_e \leftarrow KEM_{e}.Decapsulate(ct_e,sk_e)$
	$K_1 \leftarrow KDF(ss_S \ ss_e)$
	$AEAD_{K_1}(ct_C)$
	$ss_C \leftarrow KEM_{c}.Decapsulate(ct_C,sk_C)$
$K, K', K'', K''' \leftarrow KDF(ss_S \ ss_e)$	$K_2, K_2', K_2'', K_2''' \leftarrow KDF(ss_S \ ss_e \ ss_C)$
$AEAD_K(\text{key confirmation})$	$AEAD_{K_2}(\text{key confirmation})$
$AEAD_{K'}(ext{application data})$	$\checkmark \qquad \qquad AEAD_{K'_2}(\text{application data})$
$AEAD_{K''}(\text{key confirmation})$	$\checkmark \qquad \qquad AEAD_{K_2''}(\text{key confirmation})$
$AEAD_{K'''}(\text{application data})$	$AEAD_{K_2''}$ (application data)

Client Knows pk_S

Server

TCP SYN

static ($\mathsf{KEM}_{\mathsf{s}}$): $\mathsf{pk}_S, \mathsf{sk}_S$

TCP SYN-ACK

 $(\mathsf{pk}_e, \mathsf{sk}_e) \leftarrow \mathsf{KEM}_e.\mathsf{Keygen}()$ $(\mathsf{ss}_S, \mathsf{ct}_S) \leftarrow \mathsf{KEM}_s.\mathsf{Encapsulate}(\mathsf{pk}_S)$ ClientHello: $\mathsf{pk}_e, \ r_c \leftarrow \$ \{0, 1\}^{256}, \ \mathsf{ext_pdk: ct}_S, \ \mathsf{supported algs.}$

 $ss_S \leftarrow KEM_s.Decapsulate(ct_S, sk_S)$

 $ES \leftarrow HKDF.Extract(\emptyset, ss_S)$

 $accept ETS \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(ES, "early data", CH)$ $dES \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(ES, "derived", \emptyset)$

 $(ss_e, ct_e) \leftarrow KEM_e.Encapsulate(pk_e)$

ServerHello: $ct_e, r_s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}$, selected algs.

 $ss_e \leftarrow KEM_e$. Decapsulate(ct_e, sk_e)

 $HS \leftarrow HKDF.Extract(dES, ss_e)$

accept CHTS \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(HS, "c hs traffic", CH..SH) stage 2

accept SHTS \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(HS, "s hs traffic", CH..SH) stage 3

 $dHS \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(HS, "derived", \emptyset)$

 $\{\texttt{EncryptedExtensions}\}_{stage_3}$

 $MS \leftarrow HKDF.Extract(dHS, 0)$

 $fk_c \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(MS, "c finished", \emptyset)$

 $fk_s \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(MS, "s finished", \emptyset)$

 $\{\texttt{ServerFinished}\}_{stage_3}: \texttt{SF} \leftarrow \texttt{HMAC}(\texttt{fk}_s, \texttt{CH}..\texttt{EE})$

abort if $SF \neq HMAC(fk_s, CH..EE)$

accept SATS←HKDF.Expand(MS, "s ap traffic", CH..SF) record layer, AEAD-encrypted with key derived from SATS

 ${ClientFinished}_{stage_2}$: CF \leftarrow HMAC(fk_c, CH..SF)

abort if CF ≠ HMAC(fk_c, CH..SF) accept CATS←HKDF.Expand(MS, "c ap traffic", CH..CF) record layer, AEAD-encrypted with key derived from CATS

KEMTLS-PDK

KEMTLS-PDK with proactive client authentication

Client

static ($\mathsf{KEM}_{\mathsf{c}}$): $\mathsf{pk}_C, \mathsf{sk}_C$ Knows pk_S TCP SYN static (KEM_s): pk_S, sk_S

Server

TCP SYN-ACK

 $(\mathsf{pk}_e, \mathsf{sk}_e) \leftarrow \mathsf{KEM}_e.\mathsf{Keygen}()$ $(\mathsf{ss}_S, \mathsf{ct}_S) \leftarrow \mathsf{KEM}_s.\mathsf{Encapsulate}(\mathsf{pk}_S)$ $\mathsf{ClientHello: } \mathsf{pk}_e, \ r_c \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}, \ \mathrm{ext_pdk: } \mathsf{ct}_S, \ \mathrm{supported \ algs.}$

 $ss_S \leftarrow KEM_s.Decapsulate(ct_S, sk_S)$

 $\mathrm{ES} \leftarrow \mathsf{HKDF}.\mathsf{Extract}(\emptyset, \mathsf{ss}_S)$

 $\mathbf{accept} \ \mathrm{ETS} \leftarrow \mathsf{HKDF}.\mathsf{Expand}(\mathrm{ES}, \texttt{"early data"}, \mathtt{CH})$ stage 1

 ${ClientCertificate}_{stage_1}: cert[pk_C]$

 $dES \leftarrow HKDF.Expand(ES, "derived", \emptyset)$

 $(ss_e, ct_e) \leftarrow KEM_e.Encapsulate(pk_e)$

ServerHello: $ct_e, r_s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}$, selected algs.

 $ss_e \leftarrow KEM_e$. Decapsulate(ct_e, sk_e)

 $HS \leftarrow HKDF.Extract(dES, ss_e)$

 $\textbf{accept CHTS} \leftarrow \mathsf{HKDF}.\mathsf{Expand}(\mathsf{HS},\texttt{"c hs traffic"},\texttt{CH}..\texttt{SH}) \\ stage \ 2$

accept SHTS←HKDF.Expand(HS, "s hs traffic", CH..SH) dHS←HKDF.Expand(HS, "derived", Ø)

$$\label{eq:stage} \begin{split} & \{\texttt{EncryptedExtensions}\}_{stage_3} \\ & (\mathsf{ss}_C, \mathsf{ct}_C) \! \gets \! \mathsf{KEM}_c. \texttt{Encapsulate}(\mathsf{pk}_C) \end{split}$$

 $\{\texttt{ServerKemCiphertext}\}_{stage_3}: \mathsf{ct}_C$

 $ss_C \leftarrow KEM_c.Decapsulate(ct_C, sk_C)$

$$\begin{split} & \mathrm{MS} \leftarrow \mathsf{HKDF}.\mathsf{Extract}(\mathrm{dHS},\mathsf{ss}_{C}) \\ & \mathsf{fk}_{c} \leftarrow \mathsf{HKDF}.\mathsf{Expand}(\mathrm{MS},\texttt{"c finished"},\emptyset) \\ & \mathsf{fk}_{s} \leftarrow \mathsf{HKDF}.\mathsf{Expand}(\mathrm{MS},\texttt{"s finished"},\emptyset) \end{split}$$

 $\{\texttt{ServerFinished}\}_{stage_3}: \texttt{SF} \leftarrow \texttt{HMAC}(\texttt{fk}_s, \texttt{CH}..\texttt{EE})$

abort if $SF \neq HMAC(fk_s, CH..EE)$

accept SATS←HKDF.Expand(MS,"s ap traffic",CH..SF) stage 4 ______record layer, AEAD-encrypted with key derived from SATS_____

 ${ClientFinished}_{stage_2}$: CF \leftarrow HMAC(fk_c, CH..SKC)

 $\begin{array}{c} \textbf{abort if CF} \neq \textsf{HMAC}(\textsf{fk}_c, \textsf{CH..SF}) \\ \textbf{accept CATS} \leftarrow \textsf{HKDF}.\textsf{Expand}(MS, \texttt{"c ap traffic"}, \textsf{CH}..CF) \\ \hline \\ \textbf{record layer, AEAD-encrypted with key derived from CATS} \end{array} stage 5$

Communication sizes

KEMTLS

TLS 1.3 w/cached server certs

KEMTLS-PDK

		\mathbf{Eph}	Transmitted Ephem. Auth (pk+ct)		\mathbf{Sum}				Leaf pk	ched Cl. Auth	
S 	Minimum		-		Rai. 499) (sig) Rainbow 3 66	1 / 31	N/A	CA (pk) Rainbow 161,600
KEMTL	Assumption: MLWE/MSIS	Kył 800	ber 768	Kyber/ crt+ct	′Dil. 3,988	5,556	Kyber 1,568	Dilithium 3 2,420	9,554	N/A	Dilithium 1,312
X	Assumption: NTRU	NTI 699	RU 699	NTRU crt+ct	/Fal. 2,088	3,486	NTRU 1,398	Falcon 8 690	$5,\!574$	N/A	Falcon 897
	TLS 1.3	X25 32		RSA-20 sig		320	RSA-2048 528	RSA-2048 3 256	1,104	RSA-2048 272	RSA-2048 272
d TLS	Minimum	SIK 197	KE 236	$\operatorname{Rainbo}_{\operatorname{sig}}$	w 66	499	Falcon 1,58'	Rainbow 7 66	$2,\!152$	Rainbow 161,600	Rainbow 161,600
Cached	Assumption: MLWE/MSIS	Kył 800	ber 768	Dilithiu sig	$_{2,420}^{1m}$	3,988	Dilithium 3,732	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Dilithium} \\ 2 & 2,420 \end{array}$	10,140	Dilithium 1,312	Dilithium 1,312
	Assumption: NTRU	NTI 699		Falcon sig	690	2,088	Falcon 1,58'	Falcon 7 690	4,365	Falcon 897	Falcon 897
×	Minimum	SIK 197		McElie ct		561	SIKE 433	Rainbow 3 66	1,060	McEliece 261,120	Rainbow 161,600
PD				Kyber ct	768	2,336	Kyber 1,568	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Dilithium} \\ 3 & 2,420 \end{array}$	6,324	Kyber 800	Dilithium 1,312
	Finalist:							Falcon 3 690			
	Finalist: SABER	SAB 672	ER 736	SABEF ct	۲ 736	2,144	SABER 1,408	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Dilithium} \\ 8 & 2,420 \end{array}$	5,972	SABER 672	Dilithium 1,312

Handshake times, unilateral authentication

Unilaterally authenticated		31.1 ms Client sent req.	RTT, 100 Client recv. resp.	0 Mbps Server expl. auth.	Client	s RTT, 10 Client recv. resp.	Mbps Server expl. auth.
KEMTLS	Minimum MLWE/MSIS NTRU	$75.4 \\ 63.2 \\ 63.1$		$116.1 \\ 94.7 \\ 94.6$	408.6 397.4 396.0	594.6	594.5
Cached TLS	TLS 1.3 Minimum MLWE/MSIS NTRU	$66.4 \\ 70.1 \\ 63.9 \\ 64.8$	101.3 95.1	$66.3 \\ 70.0 \\ 63.8 \\ 64.7$	396.8 402.3 397.2 397.0	598.5 593.4	$402.2 \\ 397.1$
PDK	Minimum Kyber NTRU SABER	$66.3 \\ 63.1 \\ 63.1 \\ 63.1$	97.5 94.3 94.3 94.3	$66.2 \\ 63.0 \\ 63.0 \\ 63.0$	397.9 395.3 395.3 395.2	$\begin{array}{c} 591.4\\ 591.5\end{array}$	397.8 395.2 395.2 395.2

Handshake times, mutual authentication

Mutually			RTT, 100	-	195.6 ms RTT, 10 Mbps				
authenticated		Client Client		Server	Client	Client	Server		
		sent req.	recv. resp.	expl. auth.	sent req.	recv. resp.	expl. auth.		
LS	Minimum	130.2	161.4	161.3	631.2	827.5	827.5		
МТ	MLWE/MSIS	95.2	126.6	126.6	598.3	794.6	794.6		
KEMT	NTRU	95.0	126.4	126.3	595.3	791.7	791.7		
TLS	TLS 1.3	68.3	99.8	65.9	399.4	597.2	396.7		
	Minimum	71.1	102.7	69.9	403.3	602.0	402.0		
ched	MLWE/MSIS	64.5	96.2	63.9	400.1	616.8	399.5		
Ca	NTRU	66.2	98.1	64.8	398.3	597.7	397.0		
	Minimum	84.9	116.1	84.9	420.5	616.8	420.5		
×	Kyber	63.5	94.7	63.4	400.2	596.5	400.2		
PD	NTRU	63.6	94.9	63.6	397.6	593.8	397.5		
	SABER	63.6	94.8	63.5	399.4	595.5	399.3		

	KEMTLS	Cached TLS	KEMTLS-PDK			
Unilaterally aut	henticated					
Round trips until client receives response data	3	3	3			
Size (bytes) of public key crypto objects transm	itted:					
• Minimum PQ	932	499	561			
• Module-LWE/Module-SIS (Kyber, Dilithium)	$5,\!556$	$3,\!988$	2,336			
• NTRU-based (NTRU, Falcon)	$3,\!486$	$2,\!088$	2,144			
Size (bytes) of public key crypto objects transmitted:• Minimum PQ932499• Module-LWE/Module-SIS (Kyber, Dilithium) $5,556$ $3,988$ • NTRU-based (NTRU, Falcon) $3,486$ $2,088$ $2,144$ Mutually authenticatedRound trips until client receives response data 4 3 3 Size (bytes) of public key crypto objects transmitted: $1,431$ $2,152$ $1,060$ • Minimum PQ $1,431$ $2,152$ $1,060$ • MLWE/MSIS $9,554$ $10,140$ $6,324$						
Round trips until client receives response data	4	3	3			
Size (bytes) of public key crypto objects transm	itted:	-				
• Minimum PQ	$1,\!431$	$2,\!152$	1,060			
• MLWE/MSIS	9,554	$10,\!140$	6,324			
• NTRU	$5,\!574$	$4,\!365$	4,185			

Tamarin runtimes for Approach 2

Lemma		KEMTLS		K	All 4		
	sauth	mutual	both	sauth	mutual	both	variants
reachable_*	0:01:17	0:01:20	0:04:32	0:01:46	0:01:36	0:04:40	0:13:25
attacker_works_*	0:00:17	0:00:46	0:01:16	0:00:17	0:00:23	0:00:53	0:12:04
match_*	0:01:02	0:01:22	0:02:55	0:00:55	0:01:14	0:02:46	0:09:53
<pre>sk_sec_nofs_client</pre>	0:00:05	0:00:07	0:00:16	0:00:05	0:00:05	0:00:14	0:00:41
<pre>sk_sec_nofs_server</pre>	0:00:05	0:00:06	0:00:12	0:00:05	0:00:06	0:00:14	0:00:40
sk_sec_wfs1	0:00:21	0:00:10	0:01:05	0:00:17	0:00:18	0:00:41	0:03:00
sk_sec_wfs2	0:00:36	0:00:28	0:01:30	0:00:28	0:00:22	0:01:23	0:24:28
sk_sec_fs	0:01:20	0:03:05	0:06:38	0:01:21	0:01:33	0:05:07	1:39:58
malicious_accept.	0:00:13	0:01:40	0:04:13	0:00:17	0:00:22	0:01:39	27:29:37
deniability (abbr.)	0:01:02	0:12:15		0:00:24	0:29:10		
Total (excl. den.)	0:05:16	0:09:05	0:22:38	0:05:30	0:06:00	0:17:38	30:13:46

Proof of possession comparison

Sahama	Tashnisus	Regime 1	Regin	ne 2	Kybe	r512	Frodo640	
Scheme	Technique	Size	Size	Time	Size	Time	Size	Time
Proof of knowled	ge of secret key (and proof of verif	able decryption,	denoted $^{\diamond}$))				
Stern-like [51]	ZKP from SIS	$2.3\mathrm{MB}^\dagger$	$4.3\mathrm{MB}^\dagger$					
[9]	MPCitH		4.1 MB	2.4 s			$\geq 8.42 \mathrm{MB}^{\ddagger}$	
[20]	ZKP from RLWE & RSIS	$384 \mathrm{kB}^\dagger$						
[13]	Σ -prot. for permuted-kernel	233 kB	444 kB					
Ligero [5]	zkSNARK from PCPs	$157\mathrm{kB}^\dagger$	$200\mathrm{kB}^\dagger$					
Aurora [11]	zkSNARK for R1CS	$72\mathrm{kB}^\dagger$	$71\mathrm{kB}^\dagger$					
[37]	ZKP from MLWE & MSIS	47 kB, 61 kB $^{\diamond}$						
[56]	ZKP from MLWE & MSIS	47 kB*						
[57]	ZKP from MSIS & ext. MLWE	33 kB			$43.6 \mathrm{kB}^{\diamond}$			
[55]	ZKP from MLWE & MSIS	14 kB			$19.0 \mathrm{kB}^{\diamond}$			
Proof of verifiable	e generation							
Ours (31, 26)	MPCitH	251 kB	879 kB		52.9 kB	0.006 s	650 kB	0.12 s
Ours (256, 16)	MPCitH	155 kB	542 kB		33.4 kB	0.028 s	402 kB	0.63 s
Ours (1626, 12)	MPCitH	117 kB	407 kB		25.7 kB	0.109 s	302 kB	2.59 s
Ours (65536, 8)	MPCitH	79 kB	272 kB		17.8 kB	3.77 s	203 kB	85.6 s
"	ll indicates estimates for parametours (N, τ) " denotes number N c	of MPC-in-the-h	ead parties	and nur	nber τ of N	IPC repet	itions.	
e	1: modulus $q \approx 2^{32}$, number of se							
-	e 2: modulus $q \approx 2^{61}$, number of							
	per512: modulus $q = 3329$, numbe							
Frod	do640: modulus $q = 2^{15}$, number							
	[†] : Estimates by Beullens [13					-		

*: Estimate by Lyubashevsky et al. [57]. *: For proof of verifiable decryption.

Runtime for a single-threaded implementation on Intel Core i7-8565U CPU running at up to 4.6 GHz, compiled with gcc 11.2.0.