How cryptography protects your information every day

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Caesar cipher

ATTACK AT DAWN

XQQXZH XQ AXTK

Stebila • Cryptography every day

Frequency analysis

Zk nrj kyv svjk fw kzdvj, zk nrj kyv nfijk fw kzdvj, zk nrj kyv rxv fw nzjufd, zk nrj kyv rxv fw wffczjyevjj, zk nrj kyv vgfty fw svczvw, zk nrj kyv vgfty fw zetivulczkp, zk nrj kyv jvrjfe fw Czxyk, zk nrj kyv jvrjfe fw Uribevjj, zk nrj kyv jgizex fw yfgv, zk nrj kyv nzekvi fw uvjgrzi, nv yru vmvipkyzex svwfiv lj, nv yru efkyzex svwfiv lj, nv nviv rcc xfzex uzivtk kf Yvrmve, nv nviv rcc xfzex uzivtk kyv fkyvi nrp—ze jyfik, kyv gvizfu nrj jf wri czbv kyv givjvek gvizfu, kyrk jfdv fw zkj efzjzvjk rlkyfizkzvj zejzjkvu fe zkj svzex ivtvzmvu, wfi xffu fi wfi vmzc, ze kyv jlgvicrkzmv uvxivv fw tfdgrizjfe fecp.

good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.



Substitutions

 Replace each letter according to a pre-defined table

Permutations

Rearrange the letters
 according to a
 pre-defined pattern





Substitutions

Permutations

• Replace each letter according to a Rearrange the letters
 according to a

AB Still vulnerable to statistical analysis

Making it harder



Kerckhoff's Principles – 1883

Security should not depend on keeping the design of the system secret.



Only a (small) key should have to be kept secret.



World War II – The Engima Machine



 Electrical wirings lead to a sequence of permutations and substitutions, updated with each letter typed

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enigma_machine

World War II – The Engima Machine



- Initial dial positions were set based on a key for the day
- Keys distributed in codebooks from headquarters
- Keys had to be kept secret!
- Destroy the codebook at all costs!



One of the first electronic computers





https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombe

Modern cryptography

1975 – present

1970s – Birth of modern cryptography

1975–1977: US government publishes
 Data Encryption Standard (DES)

First government cipher for public use

1970s – Birth of modern cryptography

 1976: Diffie, Hellman, and Merkle invent public key cryptography

 Two parties can communicate privately without having to share a secret key in advance

Public key cryptography

- A pair of related keys:
 - public key
 - private key
- Publish the public key
- Anyone can use the public key to encrypt
- Only the person with the private key can decrypt



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We need a mathematical function

(that we can tell everyone)

that's easy to compute but hard to undo.

Some brief mathematics

Modular arithmetic

9 + 5 = 14



Exponentiation

$$5^2 = 25$$

 $5^{17} = 762939453125$

9am + 5 hrs = 2pm $9 + 5 \equiv 2 \pmod{12}$ $5^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{12}$ $5^{17} \equiv 5 \pmod{12}$

Rabin public key encryption

Key generation

Encryption

- 1. Pick two big prime numbers *p* and *q*
- 2. Compute $n = p \ge q$
- 3. Public key: *n*
- 4. Private key: *p* and *q*

Let the message *m* be a number between
 1 and *n*

2. Ciphertext: $c \equiv m^2 \pmod{n}$

Rabin public key encryption

Key generation

Decryption

- 1. Pick two big prime numbers *p* and *q*
- 2. Compute $n = p \ge q$
- 3. Public key: n
- 4. Private key: *p* and *q*

1. Compute $m \equiv \operatorname{sqrt}(c) \pmod{n}$

(Need to use *p* and *q* to compute square roots modulo *n*.)

Is it hard to break the encryption?

If it is hard to split n into its prime factors p and q,

then it is hard to decrypt the ciphertext.

Is it hard to factor *n*?

- Maybe?
- The fastest algorithm we have is really slow.
- For the size of *n* we use today on the Internet, all the computers on Earth would take about
 1 billion years to break the encryption.
- Quantum computers

 (which represent
 information using
 quantum mechanics
 rather than 0s and 1s),
 could factor efficiently.
- So we need "quantumresistant" cryptography.

Post-quantum cryptography at McMaster

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Cryptography for privacy and security

Disk encryption

Automatically encrypt all files on your hard drive.

- But key derived from your password
 - Weak password => weak key
 - Forget password => locked out

- macOS: optional (FileVault)
- Windows: optional (BitLocker)
- Linux: optional
- iOS: automatic
- Android: versions 5+

Transport Layer Security a.k.a. HTTPS



The McMaster Seminar on Higher Education: Canada@150 Join us for this special panel discussion on cultural

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Current Students

Campus Life

Research







Transport Layer Security a.k.a. HTTPS



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Events

Transport Layer Security a.k.a. HTTPS



Encrypted instant messaging

Signal protocol



- Encrypts instant messaging for more than a billion users
 - Used in WhatsApp,
 Facebook Messenger,
 Google Allo, …

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Encrypted instant messaging

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them to scan your code, to verify that your messages and calls to them are end-to-end encrypted. You can also compare the number above to verify. This is optional. Learn more.

Scan Code

Public key cryptography





Encrypted instant messaging



Metadata: "Data about data"

Telephone

- Who you're calling
- When, how long, location (mobile)
- => But not recording

Email

- Email address of recipient
- When, size
- => But not body of email
- Web
 - Address of server you're browsing
 - When, duration, size
 - => But not contents of web page



The U.S. government "kill[s] people based on metadata," but it doesn't do that with the trove of information collected on American communications, according to former head of the National Security Agency Gen. Michael Hayden.

Hayden made the remark after saying he agreed with the idea that metadata - the information collected by the NSA about phone calls and other communications that does not include content - can tell the government "everything" about anyone it's targeting for surveillance, often making the actual content of the communication unnecessary.

"[That] description... is absolutely correct. We kill people based on metadata. But that's not what we do with this metadata," **said Hayden**, apparently referring to domestic metadata collection. "It's really important to understand the program in its entirety. Not the potentiality of the program, but how the program is actually conducted.

"So NSA gets phone records, gets them from the telephone company, been getting them since October of 2001 from one authority or another, puts them in a lockbox... and under very strict limitations can access the lockbox," Hayden said and then described a hypothetical situation in which a number connected to a terrorist could be run against the metadata already collected to belo investigators find additional leads in the name of national security.

http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/05/10/we-kill-people-based-metadata/ http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/05/ex-nsa-chief-we-kill-people-based-on-metadata/



- Hides metadata and content
- Obscures traffic patterns

- Used by
 - journalists
 - whistleblowers
 - dissidents
 - activists
 - law enforcement
 - privacy-conscious citizens
 - ... criminals

Metadata leakage on the Internet This came from 131.181.46.152 YAHOO! When PRISM Co



THEO STATES OF AMER

communicate with NYT





+ can't tell these two facts are linked

Things you can do to improve your privacy and security online

Things you can do

Passwords

 For really important sites (bank, email), pick completely random passwords and don't use them elsewhere.

Things you can do

Untrusted networks

 On untrusted wi-fi networks (coffee shops, airports, hotels), consider using a virtual private network or the Tor browser for extra privacy.



https://www.torproject.org

Things you can do

Web browsing





How cryptography protects your information every day

Douglas Stebila



https://www.cas.mcmaster.ca/~stebilad/

Web browsing



The Code Book

 <u>http://simonsingh.net/books/the-</u> <u>code-book/</u>

'I've Got Nothing to Hide' and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy

<u>https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper</u>
 <u>s.cfm?abstract_id=998565</u>

Surveillance Self-Defense

<u>https://ssd.eff.org</u>

Schneier on Security

https://www.schneier.com